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ARTICLE
JULY 2014
Public workforce programs during the Great Recession
This article uses data from the recently compiled Public Workforce System Dataset to assess the response of selected 
federal workforce programs to the 2007–2009 recession. The analysis indicates that these programs responded quickly 
to the economic downturn, providing timely relief for a large number of unemployed workers. Supplemental funding 
secured through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act also enabled federal workforce programs and state 
agencies to pay benefits for longer durations and to offer expanded training and reemployment services to program 
participants.
This article examines the operations of federally funded public workforce programs during the Great 
Recession of 2007–2009. More workers lost their jobs during the recession than in any previous 
economic downturn since World War II. As a result, a record number of job seekers participated in 
federal workforce programs. Unemployed workers seeking reemployment relied heavily on 
unemployment insurance (UI), labor exchange and other reemployment services, and job training. The 
U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), in partnership with states and local entities, provides these services 
through the UI system, the Wagner–Peyser Act Employment Service, and the Workforce Investment 
Act (WIA) programs.
The UI system offers eligible unemployed workers cash assistance for up to 26 weeks in normal 
times and longer during economic downturns. The Employment Service provides job matching and job 
referral services, as well as other reemployment services, such as help searching for jobs, writing 
resumes, and honing interviewing skills. The WIA adult programs provide more intensive job search 
assistance and job training to dislocated workers and economically disadvantaged adults. Additional 
federally funded programs—including WIA Youth and Job Corps for young people, Trade Adjustment 
Assistance programs for workers displaced by foreign competition, and the Senior Community Service 
Employment Program for low-income workers age 55 and over—offer employment assistance, but 
these programs are not included in the analysis.
Public Workforce System Dataset
DOL has statutory authority to collect data for each of its major public workforce programs. As a 
condition of receiving grants from DOL, each state (plus the District of Columbia and certain U.S. 
territories) is required to submit reports on a regular basis. Program reports have generally been used by 
individual programs, primarily for program management and program performance purposes. Only 
recently has DOL attempted to compile these reports in one place for analytical and research purposes. 
In 2009, DOL created the Public Workforce System Dataset (PWSD), which assembled data back to 
1995 for the federal programs described above.1 For the analysis in this article, the original database 
was updated to the third quarter of 2011 for the UI and Employment Service programs and to the first 
quarter of 2011 for the WIA adult programs; the update captured the most recent data available at the 
time.
Reporting requirements vary by workforce program. Of the programs considered here, the UI 
program requires states to submit the greatest number of federal reports on a wide variety of program-
related benefit and tax issues. States submit UI reports to the Employment and Training Administration 
(ETA), part of DOL, at different frequencies—weekly, monthly, quarterly, and annually. The data used 
here are from the monthly ETA 5159 and ETA 9048 reports, which collect information on UI claimants 
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and reemployment services activity. The primary Employment Service report, used for the Labor 
Exchange Reporting System, is the ETA 9002 report, which states submit quarterly. State workforce 
agencies participating in the WIA programs submit individual participant-level data through the 
quarterly (and annual) ETA 9090 and ETA 9091 reports, called Workforce Investment Act 
Standardized Report Data. States also submit a number of financial reports to DOL. The PWSD 
assembles these data on a quarterly basis. All figures in this article are based on quarterly PWSD data, 
while the tables are based on annual data from multiple sources.2
The Great Recession and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
Before the Great Recession, the Employment Service and WIA programs had been funded at fairly 
steady levels, with little excess capacity to accommodate a sizable influx of new participants. When the 
recession began, these programs had neither the staff nor the funds to adequately handle the enormous 
increase in program participants. Financing the UI program is different from funding the Employment 
Service and WIA programs. According to federal budgeting rules, the UI program is an entitlement 
program, which means that the regular UI program is obligated to pay all eligible workers up to 26 
weeks of benefits, with extended benefit programs offering additional weeks of cash assistance, 
regardless of program cost.3 However, despite the prospective availability of UI funds at the onset of 
the recession, it was not clear whether existing staff capacity was sufficient for the expeditious 
processing of additional claims.
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As part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA)—the $787 billion stimulus 
package that Congress enacted in February 2009—the public workforce system received almost $12 
billion to accommodate the increased number of program participants who had already enrolled in the 
programs. Table 1 lists the amounts of ARRA funds received by various programs. In addition to these 
funds, starting in June 2008, Congress separately funded enhancements and extensions of the UI 
program and continued funding these programs for several years, with some supplemental funding 
continuing through December 2012.
Table 1. Major workforce program initiatives of ARRA (2009), and funding levels
ARRA funding category Funding amount (billion dollars)
UI Administration 0.500
UI Modernization 7.000
Wagner–Peyser Act grants to states .150
Wagner–Peyser Act reemployment services .250
WIA Adult .500
WIA Dislocated Worker 1.250
WIA Dislocated Worker National Reserve .200
High Growth and Emerging Industry grants .750
WIA Youth 1.200
Job Corps .250
YouthBuild .050
Senior Community Service Employment Program .120
Source: David H. Bradley and Ann Lordeman, Funding for workforce development in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
(ARRA), CRS report for Congress R40182 (Congressional Research Service, 2009).
Unemployment Insurance
The UI program pays benefits to unemployed workers who have a sufficiently long work history and 
who have lost their jobs through no fault of their own. In most states, regular UI benefits are generally 
paid for up to 26 weeks. By providing cash assistance to displaced workers during an economic 
downturn, the UI program operates as an automatic stabilizer of the U.S. economy. In an economic 
downturn, the amount of benefits paid out increases automatically, because the UI program is a 
budgetary entitlement not subject to budget appropriations either at the state or federal level. As the 
U.S. economy entered the recent recession, unemployment rates—as measured both by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics Current Population Survey (CPS) and by insured unemployment program enumerations
—more than doubled in the period between the cyclical unemployment low in 2007 and the cyclical 
unemployment highs in 2009 and 2010.
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State UI agencies responded quickly to the recession, succeeding in determining program eligibility 
and making payments to a greatly increased flow of UI claimants. As a result, the number of 
unemployed workers receiving first payments under the regular UI program nearly doubled between 
2006 and 2009. Because of longer durations of insured unemployment, the total amount of regular UI 
benefits paid out increased by 250 percent during this period. (See table 2.)
Table 2. UI first payments, exhaustions, and expenditures, fiscal years 2005–2011
Category 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Unemployment rates (percent)        
CPS civilian 5.20 4.80 4.60 5.30 8.60 9.80 9.20
UI 2.10 2.00 1.90 2.20 4.10 3.70 3.00
Program activity (millions)        
First payments 8.00 7.40 7.50 8.80 14.40 11.30 9.70
Regular exhaustions 3.00 2.70 2.60 3.10 6.40 7.00 5.10
Payments (billion dollars)        
Regular benefits 31.22 30.15 31.41 38.14 75.34 63.04 48.52
Extended benefits .00 .02 .02 .02 4.12 8.00 11.92
EUC08(1) .00 .00 .00 3.55 32.66 72.09 52.66
Federal Additional Compensation .00 .00 .00 .00 6.48 11.71 1.92
UCFE(2) and UCX(3) 1.38 1.31 1.30 1.36 1.09 1.52 1.58
All UI program payments (billion dollars) 32.61 31.46 32.70 43.05 119.69 156.37 116.80
State tax collections (billion dollars) 35.08 35.94 33.71 32.22 31.14 38.28 49.27
Notes:
(1) EUC08 = Emergency Unemployment Compensation 2008.
(2) UCFE = Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employees.
(3) UCX = Unemployment Compensation for Ex-servicemembers.
Note: Payments for individual UI programs may not add to totals because of rounding.
Source: UI Outlook, President's Budget FY 2013 (U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Unemployment Insurance, March 2012).
During the recession, media attention was focused on the enormous increase in the number of long-term 
unemployed workers, or those defined in the CPS as unemployed for more than 26 weeks. Because 
most states extend regular UI benefits for 26 weeks, the CPS definition of long-term unemployment 
corresponds largely to those UI recipients who have exhausted their entitlement to regular benefits. 
Between 2007 and 2010, the number of UI beneficiaries who exhausted their regular benefits increased 
from 2.6 million to 7.0 million.
The regular UI program is considered adequate when the economy is not in a recession and 
unemployment rates are at low levels, commensurate with full employment. Starting in the 1950s, 
however, Congress found the regular program inadequate in times of high unemployment rates, when 
more workers exhaust their basic 26-week entitlement. In responding to recessions in 1958 and 1961, 
Congress enacted temporary extended benefit programs to meet the short-term need for additional UI 
benefits. In 1970, Congress enacted a permanent Extended Benefits program designed to eliminate the 
need for temporary extensions by setting targets that automatically trigger extended benefits when 
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unemployment rates exceed prespecified levels. In fact, the permanent Extended Benefits program 
became a second-tier program, and Congress enacted additional temporary third-tier programs in 
response to recessions in 1971, 1974, 1982, 1991, 2002, and 2008. The temporary recessionary 
extensions that began in 1971 resulted in much longer potential durations of benefits, but, until 2009, 
the total potential duration of regular UI, Extended Benefits, and temporary emergency extensions was 
never greater than 72 weeks and, frequently, not greater than 52 weeks.4
In 2008, Congress took a series of actions that eventually led to the possibility of UI recipients 
receiving a maximum of 99 weeks of benefits. In response to the surge in long-term unemployment, 
Congress created a temporary third-tier UI program—the Emergency Unemployment Compensation 
program. In a further unprecedented step, it liberalized the permanent Extended Benefits program by 
extending access to, and the duration of, benefits. Congress also temporarily transferred Extended 
Benefits funding from the Unemployment Trust Fund to general revenue, fully relieving state UI trust 
fund accounts of any financial responsibility for the program. Between November 2009 and September 
2012, the combination of the three UI programs yielded an unprecedented duration of potential benefits 
that reached up to 99 weeks.
Although state UI accounts in the Unemployment Trust Fund are supposed to build up during 
nonrecessionary periods (so that they can fund state regular UI benefits during recessions), between 
2005 and 2007, state UI tax collections barely exceeded the regular UI benefit payments; thus, fund 
balances were not building up for the next recession. As the increase in the number of worker layoffs 
accelerated during the first few months of the recession, regular UI benefits surged, reaching $75 
billion in fiscal year 2009, while state UI tax collections responded slowly. In fiscal year 2011, regular 
UI benefit payments were two-and-a-half times the amount of state collections. As a result, by the end 
of fiscal year 2011, states had borrowed massively from the federal loan account in the Unemployment 
Trust Fund, with the outstanding state loan balance reaching $38.2 billion.
ARRA included a variety of UI provisions that were designed to ease the problems of both the 
unemployed and the financially strapped state UI programs. ARRA provisions not only extended the 
temporary Emergency Unemployment Compensation program through December 26, 2009, but also 
funded a temporary increase of $25 in weekly UI benefits. The increase, called Federal Additional 
Compensation, was made available to all unemployed workers participating in all UI programs and 
came at a cost of $20.1 billion for the period 2009–2011. The permanent Extended Benefits program 
became 100 percent federally funded, and states could temporarily ease program eligibility 
requirements to expand the number of unemployed workers eligible for the benefits. These Extended 
Benefits provisions cost the federal government $24.0 billion between 2009 and 2011. The taxation of 
UI benefits also was partially suspended. State UI agencies were given relief from the repayment and 
accrual of interest on their outstanding federal loans. Further, state UI agencies received $500 million in 
additional UI administrative funds to respond to increased workloads. Finally, to increase program 
eligibility, UI Modernization provisions were enacted as part of ARRA.5
Employment Service
State UI programs refer their claimants to the Employment Service for job referral and reemployment 
services. Since 1993, the UI program also refers targeted claimants to local workforce offices for 
reemployment services under the Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services system. At the local 
offices, UI claimants can receive referrals to jobs, assessments, counseling, labor market information, 
job search workshops, and referrals to training. During the recession, the local offices contributed to a 
large increase in reemployment services, an increase funded by a $250 million appropriation in the 
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form of Reemployment Services Grants, part of ARRA. These grants were appropriated to the 
Employment Service to serve UI claimants. Despite the additional funding, the local workforce offices 
quickly experienced resource constraints, as the number of workers seeking services expanded rapidly. 
As a result, low-cost services—orientations and assessments—saw the largest enrollments, while the 
more expensive and intensive services of counseling, and education and training, experienced smaller 
increases.6 (See figure 1.)
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The Employment Service serves all workers, whether they enter the doors of the local workforce offices 
or seek services online. Because the number of workers served fluctuates over the business cycle, 
during 2008, the Employment Service experienced a sharp increase in the number of participants 
seeking its services, with no initial increase in resources. Only in February 2009, with the passage of 
ARRA, did the Employment Service receive additional funding of $150 million for basic grants to 
states and $250 million for reemployment services for UI claimants. Between program year 2006 and 
program year 2009, the number of active job seekers participating in Wagner–Peyser Act programs 
increased nationally by over 50 percent—from 14.7 million to 22.4 million. (See table 3.) Similarly, the 
number of participants receiving staff-assisted services increased by half during this period, while the 
number of eligible UI claimants served more than doubled. Clearly, the percent increase in individuals 
being served and the percent increase in services provided were much greater than the percent increase 
in Employment Service funding from ARRA.
Table 3. Number of active job seekers participating in Wagner–Peyser Act programs, program years 2006–
2010 (in millions)
Category 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Total participants 14.7 17.8 19.6 22.4 21.8
Received staff-assisted services 9.4 9.7 11.9 14.2 13.4
Career guidance 1.9 1.8 2.8 3.3 3.4
Job search activities 4.4 4.8 5.8 7.7 6.2
Referred to employment 4.7 4.7 4.8 5.8 5.2
Entered employment rate (percent) 60.0 64.0 59.0 48.0 48.0
Eligible UI claimants 4.5 5.6 8.3 10.7 10.0
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, ETA 9002 reports.
Although between 55 percent and 65 percent of Employment Service participants received staff-
assisted services, the workforce system was under strain; participants frequently were directed to 
computer rooms in the workforce offices, searching for work mostly on their own.7 While many 
participants received some job search assistance or were referred to jobs, the percentage of workers 
who found jobs after being served declined from 64 percent in 2007 to 48 percent in 2009.
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Most of the increase in the number of participants was due to UI claimants who had permanently lost 
their jobs; these claimants represented 6.2 million of the 7.7 million participants added between 2006 
and 2009. As shown in figure 2, the increase in the quarterly number of Employment Service 
participants accelerated near the end of 2007 and continued to climb until it crested in the third quarter 
of 2010, at nearly 5 million individuals. The number of participants receiving staff-assisted services 
followed closely, but at a slower pace. It leveled off at 3.1 million a few quarters before the peak and 
slowly declined throughout the remainder of the recession and the ARRA funding period.
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The Employment Service initially faced the increased flow of program participants with the same 
budget and staffing as it had before the recession. The Employment Service budget had been fairly 
constant in nominal terms for a long period, ranging between $700 million and $800 million per year 
since 1996. Supplemental funding became available in early 2009.8 Figure 3 shows that while basic 
funding for the Employment Service programs was relatively flat throughout the recessionary period, 
the ARRA funding substantially accommodated the increase in participants during 2009 and early 
2010, even though funding per participant did not return to prerecession levels.
Workforce Investment Act
In addition to providing basic reemployment services similar to the Employment Service programs, the 
two WIA adult programs—the WIA Dislocated Worker program and the WIA Adult program—provide 
more intensive services to unemployed adults than those typically provided through the Employment 
Service. The WIA Dislocated Worker program, in particular, played a major role during the ARRA 
period in providing permanently unemployed workers with intensive services and training.
WIA Adult program. While the number of participants in the WIA Adult program increased during 
the recession, that number had been going up for more than a year before the recession began and long 
before the enactment of ARRA. Figure 4 shows the increase, starting in 2006, in the number of 
entrants, participants, and program completers (“exiters”).9 The primary reason for the increase was the 
2006 issuance of reporting instructions by DOL that permitted states to co-enroll Employment Service 
participants (and other program participants) in WIA programs. Several states (including New York) 
began co-enrolling all Employment Service participants, swelling the number of WIA participants not 
only within those states but nationally as well.
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The nature of the WIA Adult program changed with the onset of the recession. Longer unemployment 
durations translated into longer participation in the WIA Adult program. Thus, between the third 
quarter of 2008 and the third quarter of 2009, the gap between the number of entrants and exiters 
widened, leading to a surge in the number of active participants. During that period, the number of 
exiters continued to climb, but not as fast as the number of new program entrants. Shortly after the third 
quarter of 2009, however, the number of entrants and exiters leveled off and remained flat at about 
300,000 new entrants and exiters per quarter thereafter, except for a one-quarter spike of entrants in the 
third quarter of 2010.10
U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS Monthly Labor Review
Page 11
The uptick in the number and percentage of WIA Adult participants receiving intensive services was 
paralleled by an increase in the average number of reemployment services. As shown in Figure 5, that 
average number climbed from 2.2 services in the first quarter of 2008 to 2.9 services in the third quarter 
of 2009, indicating that participants were not only participating in reemployment services that required 
more staff time but also receiving a greater number of services. Another indication of the greater 
number and intensity of services was the increase in the number of days in the program. This increase 
in receipt of services occurred about four quarters after the number of services started to rise. However, 
the increase in average duration in the program also could be attributed to the difficulty in finding 
employment, as the number of days continued to climb even after the number of services received 
began to decline.11
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As the recession continued to deepen in 2008, the increase in the number of WIA Adult participants 
accelerated. (See figure 6.) In 2009, the ARRA supplemental funding helped accommodate the increase 
in participation, although the additional funds did not keep pace with the influx of participants.
WIA Dislocated Worker program. 
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The WIA Dislocated Worker program provides services to experienced workers who have permanently 
lost their jobs through no fault of their own. The program is highly responsive to increases in 
unemployment. Consequently, as the unemployment rolls swelled during 2008, the number of entrants 
into the WIA Dislocated Worker program also increased. Figure 7 shows the flow of new entrants into 
the program. From 2005 to the middle of 2008, the number of new entrants averaged approximately 
61,000 per quarter. As the recession set in, the number of new entrants increased sharply. Between the 
second quarter of 2008 and the second quarter of 2009, the number of unemployed increased by 6 
million, swelling the ranks of the unemployed to more than 14 million, an increase of 74 percent. 
During that 1-year period, the number of entrants into the WIA Dislocated Worker program increased 
by 110,000 per quarter, a much larger, 173-percent, increase.
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As durations of unemployment increased, more participants in the WIA Dislocated Worker program 
remained in it for longer periods and the rate of exiting the program declined. Starting in the second 
quarter of 2009, the average period of participation in the program began to increase. (See figure 8.) 
This occurred at the same time as ARRA funding became available, but the upward trend continued 
throughout the entire funding period, long after the number and percentage of exiters receiving training 
declined. Moreover, the average number of services received by program participants trended 
downward during most of this period. Although the increased usage of more intensive services may 
have contributed to the increased duration in program participation (at least in the early part of the 
ARRA funding period), this cannot explain the continued increase in the length of participant stay in 
the program, because the percentage of participants receiving intensive services and training fell after 
the third quarter of 2009.
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Because training was seen as prudent during a long unemployment spell, when many workers did 
not have the option to return to work, federal guidance to state workforce agencies regarding ARRA 
funding stressed that training should be emphasized. In response, state workforce agencies enrolled a 
large number of workers in training during the 2 years of WIA supplemental funding availability. 
Enrollment in training for the two WIA programs increased by 56 percent from 2008 to 2009 and 
increased further in 2010, although enrollment during the 3-year period was limited to a small portion 
of workers completing participation in the WIA programs. (See table 4.)
Table 4. WIA Adult and WIA Dislocated Worker program exiters, program years 2005–2010
Year WIA program All exiters Core services only
Core and intensive 
services only Training
Training/
Exiters
2005
Adult 243,030 60,524 74,671 107,834 –
Dislocated 
Worker 229,832 60,652 90,141 79,038 –
Total 474,862 121,176 164,812 186,872 .40
2006
Adult 616,973 413,388 94,314 104,271 –
Dislocated 
Worker 267,152 125,161 67,853 74,138 –
Total 884,125 543,549 162,167 178,409 .20
2007
Adult 831,322 595,251 124,507 111,564 –
Dislocated 
Worker 239,022 114,425 62,955 61,642 –
Total 1,070,344 709,676 187,462 173,206 .16
2008
Adult 1,026,729 657,268 260,139 109,322 –
Dislocated 
Worker 358,233 195,649 106,412 56,172 –
Total 1,384,962 852,917 366,551 165,494 .12
2009
Adult 1,186,621 687,833 346,503 152,285 –
Dislocated 
Worker 581,967 273,039 203,383 105,555 –
Total 1,768,588 960,862 549,886 257,840 .15
2010
Adult 1,243,907 763,787 327,307 152,813 –
Dislocated 
Worker 719,846 370,577 221,712 127,557 –
Total 1,963,753 1,134,364 549,019 280,370 .14
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Workforce Investment Act Standardized Report Data reporting information, various years.
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WIA Dislocated Worker basic appropriations and expenditures, measured in nominal terms, remained 
fairly constant before, during, and after the recession. The number of program participants, however, 
began to increase sharply in 2008, with the onset of the recession. Although state workforce agencies 
had to provide services for additional participants without additional funding throughout 2008, ARRA 
funds became available in 2009 and increased the capacity to provide reemployment services and 
training to the greatly increased number of participants. (See figure 9.)
THE RECENTLY COMPILED PUBLIC WORKFORCE SYSTEM DATASET permits, for the first 
time, an analytical assessment of the response of the public workforce system to the 2007–2009 
recession. Analysis based on that dataset indicates that the UI, Employment Service, and WIA 
programs responded quickly to the severe economic downturn. The programs provided assistance to 
workers as soon as the recession hit, even before supplemental funding was made available through 
ARRA. As an entitlement program, the UI program started to serve the influx of eligible unemployed as 
soon as they filed a claim. In June 2008, Congress extended benefits beyond the regular 26 weeks 
through the permanent Extended Benefits program and the Emergency Unemployment Compensation 
program. The Employment Service and WIA programs similarly began to serve unemployed workers at 
the onset of the recession, but their capacity to do so before the ARRA enactment was strained by the 
lack of additional funding.
ARRA provided supplemental funding for public workforce programs, including UI, allowing them 
to serve many more participants and enabling states to pay benefits for longer durations. The increased 
funding also expanded training and job assistance for WIA and Employment Service participants. 
However, because the increase in participation exceeded the increase in funding, expenditures per 
participant were lower than they were before the recession.
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9 The number of entrants and exiters is a measure of the flow of individuals into and out of the program, whereas the 
number of participants is a measure of the stock of individuals in the program.
10 According to Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey data compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the 
average monthly number of hires during the second half of 2009 was 1.6 million below the average monthly number of 
hires from the third quarter of 2005 through the fourth quarter of 2007, a 30-percent reduction.
11 As with the other trends in services, the average duration in the program and the number of services received 
appear to be influenced by the advent of co-enrollment in 2006. Immediately before that time, the average number of 
services was around 3.5 and the average duration in the program was around 300 days. By the fourth quarter of 2006, 
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